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Abstract
Pay for performance schemes (P4P) have been considered by many governments and implemented (for example in the UK and 
the US) for many years. The English health care system is an example of this: it has recently experienced a wide range of policy 
interventions which pay providers of health care for quality with the aim of improving the quality of care delivered to the 
population. Commissioning Quality and Innovation Payment Framework started in 2009/10 with the aim to improve quality of 
care provided by NHS Trusts. This study examines the impact of the introduction of the Commissioning Quality and Innovation 
Payment framework (CQUIN) on elective and emergency c-section rates in England for the 2010/11 CQUIN taxonomy. I show 
that the CQUIN scheme does not have any statistically significant impact on c-section rates. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Pay for performance schemes (P4P) have been considered by many governments and implemented (for example 
in the UK and the US) for many years. The English health care system is an example of this: it has recently 
experienced a wide range of policy interventions which pay providers of health care for quality with the aim of 
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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improving the quality of care delivered to the population. The majority of the UK health care services are tax free at 
the point of use and provided by the National Health Service (NHS). The NHS employs more than 1 million people 
and delivers care to a population of 53 million people only in England (NHS website, 2015). Therefore the 
performance of NHS health care workers and patient satisfaction have been a focus of the English government’s 
health care interventions. The motivation behind pay for performance schemes in health care is to provide financial 
rewards to health care providers for the level of their performance and therefore reward the quality of their services 
by making the link between quality and reimbursement more explicit. Here I focus on England. During the past two 
decades English NHS has adopted a bundle of P4P schemes varying in terms of design and the level at which 
financial rewards are given. The first (and well-known) performance scheme is the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), introduced at national level in 2004 to improve quality of primary care in the UK. This was 
followed by the introduction of Advancing Quality (AQ) in Northwest England (2008), which targeted hospitals 
(secondary and tertiary care providers). In 2009 the AQ scheme became a part of Commissioning Quality and 
Innovation Framework (Meacock et al. 2014). The CQUIN scheme is a national framework intended to improve 
quality indicators determined locally as part of negotiation between hospitals and their NHS funders (Department of 
Health CQUIN summary guide, 2010).  
In this paper, I examine a part of the CQUIN scheme. I focus on an important indicator of the quality of maternity 
care; the rate of caesarean sections (c-sections). C-section rates were included in the CQUIN contract as a (negative) 
target when it was first introduced in 2009/10 financial year in England, with the intention to reduce costs and 
promote normal births in maternity care. I group c-sections into elective and emergency c-sections depending on the 
type of admission and analyse them separately. I start with a simple difference in differences (DiD) design to 
investigate whether the introduction of the CQUIN scheme reduced c-section rates in 2010/11. The 2010/11 Hospital 
Episode Statistics maternity data are used since this set of data was the only available (officially released) data for 
the post-policy analysis at the time of the analysis. The initial year of the CQUIN scheme (2009/10) was a transition 
period, therefore, the 2009/10 taxonomy is excluded from the study. Sutton at el. (2013) suggest that providers 
considered the first year of the scheme more as a test of proof of concept and they did not really know much about 
how the scheme was supposed to work. The communication between local providers and commissioners was not 
efficient due to the tight schedule of the policy, thus the indicators agreed in the taxonomies were not clearly 
understood by providers (Sutton et al. 2013).  By design, the CQUIN scheme allows me to use naturally occurring 
control and treatment groups within a DiD design. In addition to the baseline DiD, I control for patient 
characteristics and time invariant hospital factors which might potentially be correlated with whether a certain 
hospital is in the treatment group but independent from the main impact of the policy on c-section rates. I examine 
whether the policy was endogenous to any key observables such as patient characteristics, previous years’ c-sections 
and overall performance of NHS trusts before the main analysis. Most concerns over endogeneity arises from the 
selection of goals at local level by commissioners and providers as the CQUIN indicators/topics could be selected 
based on hospitals’ previous performances (Sutton et al. 2013). For instance, if a hospital did not perform well for a 
particular indicator/topic in previous years, the indicator/topic could be included in its CQUIN scheme in the 
following year. In addition to the selection of goals, patient characteristics might have considerable effects on the 
selection of hospitals. High risk patients with informed knowledge on hospital quality can select hospitals with high 
performances and service quality. 
2. Literature Review on Pay for Performance schemes
There is an increasing number of developed countries who have adopted pay for performance schemes with a 
drive to improve provision of health care services (including the UK, US, Denmark, Canada, Germany, Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands). A large body of literature has sought to provide evidence on the impact of pay for 
performance schemes on quality, especially from the US and the UK. The main inference from the literature is that 
the impact of such schemes on quality is ambiguous and limited in the long term (Werner et al. 2011; Meacock et al. 
2014; Epstein 2007). A set of studies from the UK and the US suggests that the introduction of P4P schemes have 
had a positive impact on quality (Gillam et al. 2012; Werner et al. 2011; Steel et al. 2007). For example, a 
systematic review by Gilliam et al. (2012) examines 575 papers from the MEDLINE, EMBASE, and PsycINFO 
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databases which focus on the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the UK. The review suggests that the 
introduction of the QOF was associated by modest improvements on incentivised quality indicators for chronic 
diseases compared to the pre-incentivised period. A study by Rosenthal and Frank (2006) finds that most studies for 
the US health care market suggest that the effectiveness of P4P schemes is weak. 
The classical principal-agent theory assumes that a principal who is responsible for a multi-dimensional task 
might exert his/her effort to verifiable/incentivised dimensions of quality at the cost of a reduction in effort towards 
unverifiable/unincentivised dimensions (i.e. hospitals are multi-dimensional organizations). Within the health 
economics literature, doctors are assumed to be altruistic up to a certain level (Jack 2005; Kaarboe and Siciliani
2011). This suggests that they care about not only their patients’ health and welfare but also the payment they 
receive by achieving the overall verifiable/incentivised dimensions of quality. Eggleston (2005) suggests that P4P 
schemes might improve the overall welfare and health of patient’s measured by indicators covered by the scheme at 
the cost of a reduction in patient’s benefit measured by indicators of quality which remains unverifiable (cited in 
Kaarboe and Siciliani 2011). Despite the implications of principle agent theory for the impact of P4P schemes on 
unincentivesed/unveriable indicators of quality, from the empirical literature point of view there is a lack of clear 
evidence of the impact of such schemes on unincentivised domains/indicators in health economics. A number of 
studies suggest that the quality of health domains/indicators which are not covered by P4P schemes remains stable 
over time whereas others suggest that such initiatives lead to comprehensive improvements in the entire health care 
system (Cookson and Fleetcroft 2006; Doran et al. 2011; Steel et al. 2007; Ganz et al. 2007; Asch et al. 2004; 
Campbell et al. 2007). Eijkenaar et al. (2013) suggests that P4P schemes may crowd out health care providers’ 
intrinsic motivation and may deteriorate the non-financial motivation and lead to the diversion of efforts, therefore, a 
large number of outcome measures may be necessary in designing such schemes. Incentives on public reporting via 
patient choice and feedback reports on peer performance may help attenuate the diversion of efforts from non-
incentivised activities to incentivised activities (Eijkenaar 2013). Mehrotra et al. (2009) suggest that public reporting 
contributes to improvements in non-incentivised activities. However, a systematic review on the impact of P4P 
schemes on clinical quality by Schatz (2008) finds weak evidence for the impact of public reporting (PR) and 
feedback on the achievement of P4P schemes. In addition to the impact of P4P schemes on non-incentivised 
activities, pay for performance schemes also affect the cost effectiveness of the delivery of health care services. Cost 
effectiveness is to obtain a higher level of quality with lower costs or the same level of quality with either equal or a 
lower level of costs (Eijkenaar et al. 2013). Gillam et al. (2012) and Smith et al. (2011) suggest that the introduction 
of the QOF (Quality and Outcomes framework) scheme led to a modest reduction in cost effectiveness of mortality 
and hospital admissions for some health care domains in the UK. In the UK, the demand for secondary care has been 
rising as the population is ageing (National Health Service, 2013). Therefore to the extent that demand of people 
with chronic conditions is increasing and the cost of preventive care is high, the NHS struggles under the pressure of 
financial stability (National Health Service, 2013; Smith et al. 2011). The QOF scheme provides a direct link 
between secondary care costs and the quality of primary care. Smith et al. (2011) suggests that rewarding GP 
practices with financial incentives for ensuring preventive quality in primary care leads to a reduction in avoidable 
admissions, therefore in secondary care costs. In contrast to the impact of P4P schemes on cost efficiency in the UK, 
a survey report from the US discussing the impact of the Physician Group Practice Demonstration scheme on 
hospital efficiency suggests that this P4P scheme had a positive impact on hospital costs and savings (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2011). With respect to health care inequalities, the fundamental aim of P4P schemes 
is generally to raise quality rather than reduce disparities across different patient groups. Therefore we may not 
initially expect an improvement in equity. However, Gillam et al. (2012) and Doran et al. (2011) provide modest
evidence that QOF in the UK has reduced inequalities across patient characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity 
and socio economic deprivation. They suggest that the variation in the levels of performance was reduced in less 
deprived areas compared to deprived regions.One major concern for policy makers is how to design P4P schemes. 
Such schemes should be organized in a way leading to an overall improvement in population health and should not 
lead to any type of deterioration in patient satisfaction and reliability of data reporting. Such initiatives create 
opportunities for providers subject to the scheme to misreport data and/or to concentrate on patient selection rather 
than their own performance. A study by Smith (1995) examines the unintended consequences of publishing 
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performance data in public sector with a wide range of examples from the UK public sector. He suggests that to 
minimize public sector managers gaming (referred as “ratchet” effect in the study) P4P schemes, governments 
should use a set of performance indicators and develop reference points for indicators independent from the 
organization’s former behaviours (Smith 1995). 
3. The CQUIN scheme 
The Commissioning for Quality and Innovation payment framework (known as CQUIN) commenced in April 
2009 in England. The main motivation of the scheme is to link a proportion of NHS provider’s income (provider 
refers to an NHS trust (hospital) in the CQUIN concept) to the achievement of locally defined quality targets. The 
scheme is based on “local discretion and a discussion between commissioner and provider” (Using the CQUIN 
payment framework, 2008, p.13). One of the main goals of the scheme is to provide local improvements in quality 
and efficiency in health care within an NHS payment system (Department of Health, summary guide 2010). It is not 
intended to “provide a mechanism for investment in large-scale change. Instead, it supports a shift towards a culture 
where innovation is part of what the NHS does and recognizes locally” (Using the CQUIN payment framework 
2008). Moreover, the mission of the CQUIN scheme is set parallel to the previous payment schemes such as Quality 
and Outcomes Framework which started in 2004 with the intention that there is no conflict between those payment 
frameworks all aiming quality improvement, equity, safety and efficiency in health care services. The main focus of 
my study is on NHS acute trusts (NHS secondary and tertiary care providers) and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) who 
are the commissioners of secondary care services. I examine the 2010/11 CQUIN scheme and exclude the 2009/10 
taxonomy which was the transition period for providers and commissioners. The CQUIN scheme is not a recurrent 
scheme (the content of the scheme might differ for each financial year). The areas/domains on which a provider trust 
focuses on, and the rewards gained for improvements in those health areas and indicators, are determined by local 
negotiations between commissioners and trusts. In the 2010/2011 CQUIN framework (but not the 2009/10 scheme), 
there are two national goals in schemes for acute trusts. One of them is to reduce avoidable death, disability and 
responsiveness to the personal needs of patients (Using the Commissioning for CQUIN framework, 2010). The 
other goals are defined at either local or regional level. In 2010/11 is the financial value of the CQUIN scheme was 
increased to 1.5% of a provider contract in 2010/11 from 0.5% in the 2009/10 (although 0.3 % of the 1.5% was set 
aside for the national goals). In the CQUIN concept, a topic is defined according to a specified goal with specific 
indicators. A topic refers to a particular area/domain such as maternity, health & safety, data collection or diabetes 
where an improvement in performance is judged to be required by the commissioner and provider. An indicator is a 
measure of attainment of locally agreed quality targets. For some topics, more than one indicator might be defined 
depending on the number of targets agreed to be improved. In the English NHS health care setting, Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) are the primary organizations responsible for purchasing NHS services for their local area. Strategic 
Health Authorities (higher level purchasers) are responsible for monitoring PCTs and providers of health care who 
have not met Foundation Status requirements and ensuring that these PCTs and providers are implementing national 
policies (Fischera et al. 2012). The selection of topics, indicators and baseline performance, at the regional or trust 
level, is non-random. Topics and indicators might be regionally mandated (known as a Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA) wide topic/indicator), locally negotiated (known as fully flexible) or SHA suggested. An SHA wide 
indicator/topic or SHA mandated topic/indicator applies to all trusts in an SHA while locally flexible ones are 
negotiated between trusts and their commissioners. Therefore, it is up to both to determine the indicator and/or the 
topic. More flexibility is associated with a locally negotiated topic or indicator in terms of selection of both topic 
and indicator. Unfortunately, there is no information available for researchers on how topics and indicators are 
selected. Therefore, the CQUIN topic/indicator could be partly endogenous. I examine the effect of the scheme on 
trusts which have SHA mandated, SHA suggested or fully flexible c-section rates as an indicator. Table A.1 
(Appendix) shows that for the 2010/11 taxonomy, almost 12% of acute trusts (whose content of the CQUIN scheme 
is known) have fully flexible c-section rates as an indicator. Almost 10% of the trusts have SHA wide c-section rates 
while 3% of those have SHA suggested c-section rates in their contracts.
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4. Methodology
4.1. Research Goal
I investigate the impact of the CQUIN scheme on two sets of outcomes: elective and emergency caesarean 
section rates. I analyse these two sets of outcomes separately due to the differences in the nature of these deliveries. 
The study investigates two main questions. First, given that topics (maternity)/indicators (c-section rate) are chosen 
by trusts in consultation with the SHA (or purchasers) do trusts who choose to adopt a topic or an indicator differ 
from those who do not (“Is the adoption of the policy endogenous?”), and second, did the scheme affect rates of c-
sections? Trusts are grouped into 4 depending on the content of their local CQUIN scheme by the 2010/11 
taxonomy. All statistical analyses are carried out at the NHS trust level for elective and emergency caesarean section 
rates and mother’s and baby’s characteristics are aggregated to the same level. Trusts whose contents of the CQUIN 
scheme are unknown are excluded from the analysis (these are referred to as Group A). For the study population, 
5% of all trusts are in group A (Table A.1, Appendix). Trusts are grouped as: 
Group A: Excluded from the analysis because their CQUIN content is unknown. 
Group B: Maternity is not a topic in CQUIN scheme.
Group C: Topic is maternity but indicator is not c-section rate.
Group D: Topic is maternity and indicator is c-section rate. Therefore the treated group is group D.
If the indicator is not the c-section rate then the trust is not rewarded for hitting the target (be this a general or a 
specific reduction). Therefore the treated group, in terms of getting a reward, is group D. But group C also has a 
focus on maternity care, but reductions in c-sections are not rewarded. So in the analyses I examine groups C and D 
separately compared to group B. I first examine the effect of patient type and second, the previous year’s outcome 
on the probability of adopting the scheme. I use a “dprobit model” to see the effect of patient profile (i.e. mother’s 
age, weeks of gestation, birth weight, number of babies born at the end of a single pregnancy, and gender of baby) 
and the previous year’s c-section rates on the probability of adopting the scheme. A separate analysis is undertaken 
for each covariate separately. Secondly, I provide a test on whether there are any regional differences in the adoption 
of the policy across NHS hospitals. Hospitals are classified by NHS regions (south, middle and north) for the 
2010/11 taxonomy. I also examine whether there is any effect of being a good performer to see whether “high 
quality” trusts are more likely to adopt the policy. As a measure of good performance, I use performance scores 
defined by the NHS Performance Ratings published by the NHS Quality regulator (The Care Quality Commission). 
NHS trusts are assessed on various aspects of their performance including performance on clinical outcomes, 
waiting times, patient access, cost effectiveness of health services, health inequalities, population health etc. (NHS 
Performance Rating 2008/2009, 2009). The rating system is based on 4 point scale, excellent, good, fair and weak 
respectively (NHS Performance Rating 2008/2009, 2009). I exploit “Overall quality of services score” where trusts 
are assessed depending on the performance against core standards, existing commitments and national priorities 
scores (NHS Performance Rating 2008/2009 2009). Trusts with excellent and good overall quality scores are treated 
as “trusts with good performance” and trusts with fair and weak scores are considered as “trusts with bad 
performance”. The classification of trusts is based on whether or not these three standards are met. Any treatment 
effect is investigated by a difference in differences method. As I examine only the 2010/11 CQUIN scheme, 
2010/11 data are considered as after and 2007/08 to 2008/09 data as before and the 2009/10 data is dropped from the 
whole analysis. In general, I have three different sets of comparison groups. With the first comparison group, which 
is group 1, I compare (B vs. C or D). Here, I am testing whether inclusion of maternity as a topic leads to a reduction 
in c-section rates compared to trusts without maternity as a topic. With comparison group 2, I compare (B or C vs. 
D). Therefore, I am testing whether being rewarded for the reduction in c-section rates makes a difference in the 
outcome of interest compared to trusts whose topics are either maternity or another topic and where the indicator is 
not c-section rate. With comparison group 3, where I look at only those trusts where maternity is a topic and I 
compare (C vs. D), I am investigating whether inclusion of indicator reduces c-section rates when maternity as a 
topic. In a seperate analysis, the effect of having more than one maternity indicator is examined.  I investigate 
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whether trusts’ performances in terms of c-sections change less or more depending on whether they have one 
maternity indicator which is c-section rate only, or have other maternity indicators as well as c-section rate. 
Therefore, the focus is on variation within group D (all trusts in this group have c-section rates as an indicator in 
their local CQUIN contract). The test is based on the idea that having only one maternity might reduce c-section rate 
more than the ones with more maternity indicators as well as c-sections since those trusts might allocate more time 
on c-sections. In a final analysis, I investigate whether there is any effect of mandation of the indicator on c-section 
rates. Trusts in group D are classified into two sets according to whether they have SHA mandated (SHA wide) or 
not (SHA suggested/fully flexible) c-sections rates as the indicator in their local contract. I use a difference in 
differences design which allows me to use different sets of control and treatment groups. First, I estimate an OLS 
model with and without controls. Second, I provide controls for unobserved time invariant hospital factors which 
could be correlated with treatment status using a fixed effect model. This accounts for some proportion of omitted 
variables bias. The fixed effect model is: 
                                                             itiiiiit etDXtDY IOTPED ')(
where itY is the outcome for trust i , itD is the group dummy indicating whether or not the topic is maternity or c-
section rate is an indicator (depending on the comparison we are undertaking), t is the time dummy, itX is average 
patient characteristics at trust level, iD t is the interaction between group and time dummy that indicates whether 
there is an effect of the policy on the outcome, iI is the trust fixed effect, and ite is the error term. 
4.2. Data 
The study uses anonymised maternity data from the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database. Ethical approval 
over and above that required for access to anonymised HES records was not sought. HES database contains
information on all inpatient, outpatient and A&E admissions for English NHS trusts (Health and Social Care 
Information website, 2014.1
4.3. Analyses and Results
The taxonomy data are from Department of Health. The 2010/11 taxonomy is linked to 
2007/08, 2008/09 and 2010/11 HES data respectively. The post-policy period only consists of the 2010/11 HES data 
as later data were not available at the time of the analysis. The HES maternity data provide information from two 
main resources; (a) babies’ records and (b) mothers’ records. The main analysis uses information from both records 
(but mainly from birth records). Outcome variables (rates of elective and emergency c-sections), mother’s age, birth 
weight (kg), number of babies born at the end of a single pregnancy, ethnicity, gender of the baby, mode of delivery 
and onset of labour are aggregated to the trust level for each financial year from individual patient records. 
Performance data are used to group trusts as “trusts with good” and “trusts with bad performances”. 2007/08, 
2008/09 and 2010/11 HES data and the 2010/11 taxonomy data are linked to the overall performance scores for 
relevant years. Therefore, the classification of trusts is based on their lagged overall performances (t-2).
Performance data are extracted from the Care Quality Commission database.
Table 1.1. presents descriptive statistics on key variables used in the evaluation of the CQUIN scheme for the 
2010/11 taxonomy. The mean proportion of emergency c-sections is higher than the mean proportion of elective c-
sections as expected. Table 1.1 also shows a relatively high amount of within trust variance in key variables. This 
provides support for identification of CQUIN effect by exploiting within trust variation.     
I also examine the distribution of regionally mandated (SHA wide), locally flexible or SHA suggested c-sections 
only or with multiple maternity indicators including c-sections. These are presented in Table A.1 in Appendix. With 
1 Hospital Episode Statistics collect data and information on all the inpatient and outpatient NHS hospital admissions in England. (all financial 
years for Hospital Episode Statistics start on the 1st of April end on the 31st of March) For more details see: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/hes.
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regards to the endogeneity of the policy, there is no association between patient characteristics such as number of 
previous pregnancies, mother’s age, weeks of gestation (days), birth weight (kg), number of babies born at the end 
of a single pregnancy and baby’s gender (male) and the probability of adopting the CQUIN scheme (results are 
available from the author). In addition to patient characteristics, my results also suggest that there are regional 
differences in adoption of the policy. Hospitals are classified by NHS regions (south, middle and north). The 
reference group is being located at the south part of England. I find that trusts located in the northern and middle 
parts of England are more likely to be treated in groups C or D compared to the reference group. I also find that 
there is no statistically significant association between previous’ years outcomes and the treatment status. However, 
there is some indication for an association between always being a good performer and the treatment status. I find 
that hospitals who are always good performers are more likely to adopt the policy. This could due to the fact that 
these hospitals may want to do better on every aspects of maternity care. Tables 1.2. and 1.3. present results for the 
impact of the CQUIN scheme on elective and emergency c-sections respectively. OLS estimates in Table 1.2, 
Columns (1) and (2) show no indication of an impact of the policy on rates of elective c-sections. This is consistent 
across different DiD specifications. These results are robust to the inclusion of trust fixed effects (Columns (3) and 
(4)). The inclusion of patient characteristics along with other controls does not add much to the precision of 
estimates (Columns (2) and (4)). Table 1.3 suggests that for 2010/11, after the inclusion of patient characteristics, 
there is some indication that having maternity as a topic and c-section rate as an indicator decreases emergency c-
section rates shown by the negative and significant coefficient in Column (4) for the first comparison group (B vs. 
C/D, 10% significance level). I test for whether trusts with only one maternity indicator (which is the c-section rate) 
tend to have reductions in c-sections. In 2010/11, for elective and emergency c-section rates, there is no effect of 
having only c-section rate as an indicator in the CQUIN scheme. In other words, the number of maternity indicators 
is not associated with any significant change in c-section rates. I further investigated whether the scheme being SHA 
mandated (i.e. applying to all trusts in an SHA) has a larger effect than schemes negotiated between trusts and their 
local commissioners. I therefore split those trusts with c-section rate as an indicator into two groups: those with 
SHA mandated indicator vs. not SHA mandated (i.e. SHA suggested and full flexible). I find no evidence for such 
an effect on c-section rates (results are available from the author). Overall, my results suggest that the 2010/11 
CQUIN scheme does not lead to any particular improvements in c-section rates. OLS and fixed effects models 
provide almost similar results; therefore the inclusion of average patient characteristics does not improve the 
precision of the estimated coefficients for the impact of the CQUIN as the results remain fairly the same
5. Conclusion
This is the first study examining the effect of the 2010/11 CQUIN schemes on caesarean c-section rates using a 
difference in differences methodology. The 2010/11 CQUIN taxonomy is used along with 2007/08, 2008/09 and 
2010/11 HES data and average patient characteristics are included to account for possible observable confounders. 
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at hospital level and average patient characteristics, my results weakly 
indicate that hospitals tend to reduce the amount of emergency c-sections after the introduction of the CQUIN 
scheme but not change elective c-sections. Therefore, there is no strong indication for hospitals controlling over 
elective c-sections. Emergency c-sections are deliveries where mothers have to give birth immediately to reduce 
risks associated with their babies’s as well as their own health status. Therefore, this weak evidence is consistent 
with the fact that hospitals have less control over the occurrence of this type of deliveries. In the second year of the 
policy (2010/11), a higher proportion of NHS provider’s income was linked to the achievement of locally defined 
quality targets (0.5% in 2009/10 to 1.5 in 2010/11, Department of Health summary guide 2010). From the 
commissioners’ point of view, this increased the expectation of the achievement of the locally defined CQUIN 
targets. However, Sutton et al. (2013) provides further information on the fact that concerns over the achievement of
goals and targets and the communication between providers and commissioners persisted in the second year. 
Therefore, this provides a consistent explanation why the 2010/11 CQUIN scheme did not lead to any significant 
improvements in c-section rates. 
Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics (2010/2011 CQUIN taxonomy)
Variable
observations
Mean SD Between
trusts SD
Within
trusts SD
Number
of observation
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2010/11 CQUIN taxonomy
Elective c-section rate 0.090 0.044 0.033 0.029 291
Emergency c-section rate 0.150 0.132 0.087 0.099 291
Normal birth rate 0.580 0.196 0.137 0.141 291
Number of previous pregnancies 1.058 0.681 0.491 0.473 291
Mother’s age 28.97 2.102 1.538 1.439 291
Weeks of gestation (days) 38.77 2.108 1.618 1.358 291
Birth weight (kg) 3.29 0.265 0.176 0.199 291
Number of babies born at the end of a 
single pregnancy 1.03 0.015 0.011 0.009 291
Male babies (%) 0.509 0.120 0.070 0.097 291
Index of multiple deprivation 25.382 8.722 8.647 1.346 291
The estimation sample consists of 291 NHS acute trusts (97 groups) for 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2010/11 financial years. Group A (N = 15) 
is excluded. SD indexes standard deviation. 
Table 1.2. The impact of the CQUIN on elective c-section rate, 2010/2011 taxonomy
OLS Fixed effect model
Groups w/o controls w controls w/o controls w controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maternity is the topic: B vs. C|D
Policy = on 0.008 0.010* 0.008 0.011**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Trusts = C|D -0.011 -0.003
(0.008) (0.007)
Policy on among C|D 0.012 0.003 0.012 -0.002
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
N 291 291 291 291
R 0.0292 0.462 0.054 0.488
C-section is the indicator: B|C vs. D
Policy = on 0.014** 0.012** 0.014** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Trusts = D -0.012 -0.009
(0.009) (0.006)
Policy on among D -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
N 291 291 291 291
R 0.0352 0.476 0.045 0.493
C-section is the indicator given maternity is the topic: C vs. D
Policy = on 0.031* 0.015 0.031* 0.028**
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011)
Trusts = D -0.007 -0.012
(0.012) (0.009)
Policy on among D -0.019 -0.014 -0.019 -0.029
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018)
N 123 123 123 123
R 0.0822 0.523 0.109 0.658
Table 1.3. The impact of the CQUIN on emergency c-section rate, 2010/2011 taxonomy
OLS Fixed effect model
Groups & Years w/o controls w controls w/o controls w controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maternity is the topic: B vs. C|D
Policy = on -0.033* -0.017 -0.033* -0.018
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015)
Trusts = C|D -0.033 -0.041**
(0.024) (0.020)
Policy on among C|D 0.021 0.028 0.021 0.036*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
N 291 291 291 291
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R 0.0182 0.40 0.016 0.607
C-section is the indicator: B|C vs. D
Policy = on -0.028* -0.009 -0.028* -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Trusts = D -0.029 -0.046**
(0.027) (0.022)
Policy on among D 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.009
(0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019)
N 291 291 291 291
R 0.0142 0.40 0.014 0.601
C-section is the indicator given maternity is the topic: C vs. D                           
Policy = on -0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.007
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013)
Trusts = D -0.008 -0.019
(0.032) (0.023)
Policy on among D 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.027
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.020)
N 123 123 123 123
R 0.0032 0.660 0.003 0.882
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Appendix 
A.1. Distribution of trusts with SHA mandated, SHA suggested and fully flexible c-section rate
Table A.1: Distribution of trusts with SHA mandated, SHA suggested and fully flexible c-section rate given c-section rate is the only 
indicator/there are multiple maternity indicators as well as c-sections.
Panel A      Panel B
                    Groups Type of indicator
A B C D Fully 
flexible 
indicator
SHA wide 
indicator
SHA 
suggested 
indicator
2010 taxonomy for 2010/11 HES maternity data
N 5 56 18 23 Group 1 8 0 0
Group 2 3 9 3
The only group who have c-section rate as an indicator is group D.  The distribution is given for the set of trust in the study 
population for 2010/11 HES maternity data. Groups 1 and 2 are subsets therefore of Group D. Group 1 are trusts with only c-
sections as an indicator. Group 2 are trusts with multiple maternity indicators as well as c-section rate. N = number of trusts in each 
group.
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